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Abstract
snBench is a platform on which novice users compose and deploy distributed Sense and Respond
programs for simultaneous execution on a shared, distributed infrastructure. It is a natural imperative
that we have the ability to (1) verify the safety/correctness of newly submitted tasks and (2) derive the
resource requirements for these tasks such that correct allocation may occur. To achieve these goals
we have established a multi-dimensional sized type system for our functional-style Domain Specific
Language (DSL) called Sensor Task Execution Plan (STEP). In such a type system data types are
annotated with a vector of size attributes (e.g., upper and lower size bounds). Tracking multiple size
aspects proves essential in a system in which Images are manipulated as a first class data type, as image
manipulation functions may have specific minimum and/or maximum resolution restrictions on the input
they can correctly process.
Through static analysis of STEP instances we not only verify basic type safety and establish upper
computational resource bounds (i.e., time and space), but we also derive and solve data and resource
sizing constraints (e.g., Image resolution, camera capabilities) from the implicit constraints embedded
in program instances. In fact, the static methods presented here have benefit beyond their application
to Image data, and may be extended to other data types that require tracking multiple dimensions (e.g.,
image “quality”, video frame-rate or aspect ratio, audio sampling rate). In this paper we present the
syntax and semantics of our functional language, our type system that builds costs and resource/data
constraints, and (through both formalism and specific details of our implementation) provide concrete
examples of how the constraints and sizing information are used in practice.
† This research was supported in part by a number of NSF awards, including CISE/CSR Award #0720604, ENG/EFRI Award
#0735974, CISE/CNS Award #0524477, CNS/NeTS Award #0520166, and CNS/ITR Award #0205294.
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1 Introduction
Motivation
The Sensor Network WorkBench (snBench) is a collection of compile-time tools and run-time compo-
nents that enable the painless development and deployment of Sense and Response services that run
on a shared infrastructure. Toward snBench’s goal of enabling novice users to compose these services
we provide our users with a functional-style Domain Specific Language (DSL) for specification, called
STEP (Sensor Task Execution Plan).1 STEP is resource agnostic insofar as service logic may refer to
particular types of resources (e.g., an Image sensor) without indicating which specific resources should
be utilized within the service.
Our ability to allocate resources on which to deploy STEP services is contingent upon our ability
to verify the safety of new services and to derive resource requirements from new service instances.
While the motivation of the snBench project and specific implementation details for its architecture
and run-time components have been published elsewhere ([OBK06]), in this paper we present the static
analysis techniques that we have developed to provide safety and resource constraint extraction on our
sensing-centric STEP language. We base our type system on sized (a.k.a. static-dependent) type systems,
wherein upper bound size annotations on types coupled with cost functions are used to determine memory
(storage) and processing (worst case execution) bounds.
We expand our size tracking to multiple dimensions (i.e., multiple dimensions of size annotations)
toward the goals of (1) supporting Images as a first-class data type and (2) enabling the static inference
of required image (and image sensor) resolutions from implicit constraints.
Unlike traditional scalar data, both size bounds of an Image (i.e., upper and lower, where the lower
bound is the potential minimum image resolution) may have an impact on functional correctness. For
example, attempting to recognize a face in a low-resolution image may never succeed, or worse, might
diverge depending on the implementation. While one could consider adding additional types and subtyp-
ing relations to the type system to support awareness of image resolutions (e.g., LowResolutionImage,
MediumResolutionImage, HighResolutionImage) it should be obvious that this sort of solution does not
scale.
Our sized type system can not only bound costs for memory and computation, but also produces
sensing domain specific resource constraints. In tracking bound both upper size bounds and lower
size bounds we are able to make statements that bound a worst-case execution time and also provide
bounds for Image resolution; the latter property ultimately leads to establishing the correctness of Image
processing expressions.
A Motivating Example
Our goal is to be able to leverage the size annotations in the type system to provide both an upper-bound
for computational requirements of services (as prior works have done), while additionally (1) maintaining
1We actually provide other, high-level languages that are compiled down to STEP as our common Instruction Set Archi-
tecture.
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minimum size aspects to verify correctness in the presence of functions that require a minimum size to
ensure correctness and (2) determining and maintaining implicit constraints on resources and data sizes
as extracted from contextual usage in a given service instance.
For example consider the code fragment below:
(⇤ every 100 mi l l i s e cond s , take an image from ”any” camera and
t r y to d e t e c t motion . I f motion i s de tec t ed , send an e mail . ⇤)
letonce img = get ( sensor ( image ,any ) ) in
period (100ms ,
trigger ( f a c ed e t e c t ( img ) , emai l ("mocean" , img ) )
)
In the code given, the variable img represents an image captured from “any” image sensor. However
not all image sensors (i.e., cameras) have the same capabilities with respect to image resolution (e.g.,
a webcam might capture images at a resolution several times lower than that of an embedded Pan-
Tilt-Zoom camera). In this program instance there are implicit constraints on the image that indicate
that not just any sensor will do. The function (or as we call it, Opcode) facedetect constrains the size
of img, as it requires a minimum resolution to correctly detect a face in an image. While the explicit
periodicity function (or as well call it, Flowtype) period indicates that this expression must run every
100 milliseconds. Thus there is another constraint on the resolution; the resolution must also be low
enough to allow computation every 100 milliseconds. These constraints on the resolution of the image
must propagate back to the image sensor from which the image will be acquired to ensure that the sensor
reserved for this program can support the required resolution (or range of resolutions).
Our sized constraint set (when solved) can be used to (1) guide task assignment (e.g., do not split
computation over the network where the data size will incur a steep networking overhead), (2) guide
resource allocation (e.g., reserve the correct sensor determined from a resolution range derived from
use in context), and (3) determine if a program is fundamentally or temporarily infeasible (e.g., some
specific resolution too low to perform computations, required periodicity can not be met given current
available resources).
In this paper we present our type system as applied to a subset of our domain specific language,
give details of its implementation, and work through concrete examples of the system in use. The
organization of the rest of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a brief, high-level overview of
snBench, Section 3 provides the syntax of our DSL and the static and dynamic semantics of our type
system, and Section 4 applies this formalism to some examples to show the system in action as well as
giving an overview of our implementation. In Section 5 we indicate some of the many possible future
directions for this work.
Related Work
Bounding the execution time of programs and program fragments is a well-established problem in com-
puting. There was a large interest in applying custom type systems to domain specific languages in the
late nineties (e.g., the USENIX Conference on Domain-Specific Languages (DSL) in 1997 and 1999).
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Indeed, Our work has been largely inspired by existing works that aim to solve execution time bounding
via an upper bound size annotation on types within a type system. These works include Static Depen-
dent Costs [RG94], Sized Type Systems [HPS96], and Sized Time Systems [LH96]. All establish a formal
type system that has been annotated with upper size bounds on datatypes to estimate an upper bound
on execution time and memory requirements given input size. We intended to use these techniques (with
small adjustments to support STEP) in order to verify basic type safety and extract execution and mem-
ory bounds to guide resource allocation and scheduling within snBench. The operating environment of
snBench is intrinsically distributed and time dependent, yet it seemed that these existing works should
have been able to be ported more or less directly ([HFH06], for example, is the current incarnation of
the Sized Time System, and is aimed directly at the real-time embedded sensing community). However,
this was not the case.
Our language (and infrastructure) supports the direct modification of Image data which, unlike
traditional scalar data, has an overloaded notion of size (i.e., resolution) that has a direct impact
on functional correctness. In this environment the type signature of a function must include explicit
resolution (size) bounds to convey what size ranges of data a function can correctly process. Thus our
needs began to diverge almost immediately. In the existing works size annotation has nothing to do
with functional correctness, moreover we recognized a need to track a lower size bound (annotation)
in addition to the upper size bound. From the need to add the additional lower size bound we have
established a system in which the size annotations are multi-dimensional ; while the formalism described
in section 3 only includes a lower and upper size bound, Section 5 discusses how easily more dimensions
could be added and gives examples.
Additionally our system uses size constraints to solve for data size when it is not explicitly specified
by the programmer (i.e., size annotation variables). Our constraint set is explicit within the typing
rules yet constraints are derived implicitly from program code, using our constrained size type signature
for primitive operators. In solving the constraint set we can deduce feasible (and/or optimal) data
sizes which directly map to image resolutions, resource constraints and sensor capabilities for image
manipulation programs. Finally we allow primitive operators that directly manipulate the constraint
set, allowing the programmer to explicitly constrain types without influencing the execution (so called,
Flowtypes). We are unaware of any other such work that treats images as first class datatypes or that
uses a type system to statically create such size constraint relationships to deduce required image sizes
and sensor capabilities.
It is also worth noting that our language includes a slightly unusual let semantic which is advantageous
in time dependent programming environments. While several functional languages include this same let
behavior in their implementation, in time-independent operating environments implementation of the
let discipline in this way does not influence the result of the computation, but rather is provided as an
optimization. In our environment, this is not the case. Thus, we define our let semantic formally and
include it in our proofs for soundness and completeness.
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2 snBench Overview
To orient the reader to the platform to ease further discussion, in this section we briefly highlight the
salient features of snBench. The vision, goals and high-level overview of the snBench infrastructure
have been reported elsewhere [BBKO05] and implementation details may be found in [OBK06].
snBench consists of programming support and a runtime infrastructure for Sensor Networks com-
prised of heterogeneous sensing and computing elements that are physically embedded into a shared
environment. We refer to such a physical space with an embedded SN as a Sensorium [Bos]. The
snBench framework allows Sensorium users to easily program, deploy, and monitor the services that
run in this space while insulating the user from the complexity of the physical resources therein. We liken
the support that snBench extends to a Sensor Network to the support that higher-level languages and
operating systems provide to traditional, single machine environments (language safety, APIs, virtual-
ization of resources, scheduling, resource management, etc). snBench is extensible by design such that
new hardware and software capabilities may be painlessly folded into the infrastructure by its advanced
users and those new capabilities easily leveraged by its novice users.
snBench provides a high-level programming language with which to specify programs (services) that
are submitted to the resource management component which in turn disseminates program fragments to
the run-time infrastructure for execution. At the lowest level, each sensing and/or computing element
hosts a Sensor eXecution Environment (SXE) that abstracts away specific details of the host and attached
sensory hardware. SXEs are assigned tasks by the resource management components of snBench
the Sensorium Service Dispatcher and Sensorium Resource Manager in tandem monitor SN resources,
schedule (link) and deploy (bind) tasks on to available SXEs. A graphical representation of this end-to-
end support is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The SN program life-cycle as enabled by snBench. Rectangles represent data, circles represent tasks/pro-
cesses, and the dashed lines represent control communication (dependency).
The Virtual Instruction Set Architecture of snBench is the Sensorium Task Execution Plan (STEP),
a domain specific tasking-language used to describe complete programs and fragments alike. A STEP
program is a graph of a SN programs’s data-flow and computational dependency with the nodes of a
STEP graph representing the atomic computation and sensing operations and edges representing data
flow. In execution, demand for evaluation pushed down from the root of the graph to the leaves and
values percolate up from the leaves back to the root. STEP nodes describe data, control flow (e.g.,
repetition, branching) and computation operations that we refer to as STEP Opcodes and the SXE
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maintains implementations of the Opcodes with which it may be tasked.
STEP tasks (or subtasks) are assigned (linked) to the available SXEs for execution by the Service
Dispatcher. The Service Dispatcher must, therefore, be able to characterize the STEP tasks and ensure
that the resources required by the tasks are currently available in the system. We make a distinction
between uncertified STEP tasks and those that have been certified (i.e., validated by our type system as
correct and annotated with resource requirements). 2 It is our type system that provides this certification
and the resource requirements it extracts are essential to enabling the Service Dispatcher to correctly
allocate resources (SXEs).
3 Formalism for “Core” STEP
In this section we present the formal logic that underlies the verification component described above.
The type system we present in this Section supports a subset of the complete STEP programming
language; we call this subset “Core” STEP. We discus the challenges of supporting the few remaining
STEP components in Section 5.
Readers who are actively familiar with the project may note that what is presented as STEP appears
to be STEP’s high-level, functional sibling SNAFU. In fact, SNAFU is a largely a convenience wrapper
for STEP, including some additional syntactic sugar (which we do not address in this paper).
In Core STEP we formally present only one let form. As we show later, this let behaves in a way
that is temporally interesting. The Complete STEP supports other, traditional let forms (i.e., lazy and
eager), yet we omit them from the Core formalism as they are well-known and relatively less interesting
in our domain.
3.1 Syntax of Expressions
Below we define the syntax of the valid expression forms of Core STEP.
2Certification could happen entirely on the client side in an environment in which the user/service composer can not forge
certification output.
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e ::= expressions
v value
x variable
cond e e e conditional (if-then-else)
let {xi=ei}i21..n in e let binding
get e read a sensor
op e opcode/primitive operation
trigger {xi=ei}i21..n e e construct for repetition
v ::= values
0 | 1 | 2 | . . . integer
true | false boolean
i image
time | image sensor
op ::= op1 | op2 | op3 | . . . opcodes
3.2 Preliminary Definitions
The evaluation (dynamic semantics) of expressions take the general form:
e | ⌫ | t ! e0 | ⌫0 | t + 1
Where ⌫ is a special variable store required for our let semantic, and t is a discretized time that
increments per evaluation step (e.g., computation count, clock tick). We read this in English as “ the
expression e and its variable store ⌫ take an evaluative step to the new expression e0 with new variable
store ⌫0.”
3.2.1 Definition: The Variable Store ⌫:
The evaluation of the STEP language is time dependent insofar as values that are read from the sensing
environment may change over time. Thus, when a function is evaluated will directly e↵ect the value
retrieved (specifically via the sensor reading function, get). Put di↵erently, the let semantic we provide
has a direct impact on the values retrieved for a variable (e.g., an eager let retrieves a reading at
time 0, a typical lazy or by-need let retrieves a new reading at every time the substituted variable is
encountered). To best accommodate the needs of STEP and this temporal dependence, we define our
default let-binding to be a hybrid approach; we o↵er a deferred evaluation (i.e., by need) that also o↵ers
the reuse provided by eager evaluation (i.e., with caching).
To achieve the desired result our let-binding construct manipulates a variable store ⌫ that stores the
mapping of variables to unreduced expressions which will be reduced within the environment itself when
the variable is encountered (by need). Should the same variable be encountered again further in the
expression, the mapping in ⌫ will later point to the fully reduced value and will therefore return that
previously computed value (with caching).
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We define the store, ⌫ below, whose domain ranges over variable symbols, each pointing to valid
STEP expression (either an unreduced expression or a value).
⌫ = {x1 7! e1, x2 7! e2, . . . , xn 7! en}
Domain (⌫) = {x1, . . . , xn}
⌫(xi) = ei
3.2.2 Definition: The free-variable function FV
FV calculates the free-variables in an expression (e) or expression and store pairing (e | ⌫).
FV (v) = ?
FV (x) = {x}
FV (cond e1 e2 e3) = FV (e1) [ FV (e2) [ FV (e3)
FV (let {xi = ei}i21..n in e) = (
n[
i=1
FV (ei) [ FV (e))  {x1 . . . xn}
FV (get e) = FV (e)
FV (op e) = FV (e)
FV (trigger {xi = ei}i21..n en+1 en+2) = (
n[
i=1
FV (ei) [ FV (en+1) [ FV (en+2))  {x1 . . . xn}
FV (e | ⌫) = (
[
{FV (⌫(x)) | x 2 Domain (⌫)} [ FV (e))  Domain (⌫)
3.2.3 Definition: expression and store pair closure
We say e | ⌫ is closed if and only if FV (e | ⌫) = ?.
3.3 Dynamic Semantics
In this section we present the evaluation rules (dynamic semantics) for the various constructs (i.e.,
syntactic forms) of the language.
3.3.1 Conditional
(E-IfTrue) cond true e2 e3 | ⌫ | t ! e2 | ⌫ | t + 1
(E-IfFalse) cond false e2 e3 | ⌫ | t ! e3 | ⌫ | t + 1
(E-If)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1
cond e1 e2 e3 | ⌫ | t ! cond e01 e2 e3 | ⌫0 | t + 1
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3.3.2 Opcodes
We refer to primitive operators in STEP as Opcodes. Evaluation of opcodes is strict (arguments must
be reduced to values before the opcode may be evaluated). Evaluation and typing rules for specific
instances of opcodes (e.g., facedetect, resample) are given in Section 4. The general form is presenter
here.
(E-Op1)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1
op e1 | ⌫ | t ! op e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1
where op 2 {op1 | op2 | op3 | . . .}
(E-OpApply) op v1 | ⌫ | t ! v2 | ⌫ | t + 1
where v2 = Apply (op v1)
and op 2 {op1 | op2 | op3 | . . .}
3.3.3 Sensor reads (and the physical sensor environment E)
As STEP is a sensing centric DSL, it is essential that we have the ability to read values from sensors
that are embedded in the physical environment. We imagine a logical array that contains all the data
that a sensor will produce at every discretized time interval. Reading a value from a sensor is analogous
to extracting a value from this array indexed at the current time (t). We define an abstract matrix E
to correspond to the physical sensing environment such that Ei,j is the reading (value) from sensor i at
discretized time j . We define the function fE(i , j) to extract the jth value (corresponding with time j)
from stream (sensor) i from E .
We define the (strict) function get to extract a value from the sensing environment. In the simplified
Core STEP we support only two types of sensors, a time sensor (time) and Image sensors (image).
(E-Get1)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1
get e1 | ⌫ | t ! get e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1
(E-GetApply) get v1 | ⌫ | t ! v2 | ⌫ | t + 1
where v2 = fE(v, t)
and fE : Sensor ⌧ ⇥ Int ! ⌧
The time sensor returns the number of evaluations (computations) since the beginning of the evalu-
ation (i.e., returns t).
(E-GetTime) (get time | ⌫ | t)! (t | ⌫ | t + 1)
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3.3.4 Let binding (by-need with caching)
Again, our let semantic is a hybrid approach that is deferred evaluation (ala lazy) coupled with evaluation
re-use (ala by-value/eager). To facilitate this, when a let is encountered, its assignments are added
directly to the store ⌫ (via E-LetN) without evaluation. Expressions and instead are evaluated within
⌫ when their variable is encountered elsewhere (via E-Var1 and E-Var2) including variables that point
to other variables. Our let expression allows for simultaneous assignment; in E-LetN we assume that
all terms xi are assigned simultaneously and may have interdependency.3
Variable terms are subject to alpha renaming to avoid variable capture, etc.
(E-LetN)
let {x1 =e1,...,xn =en} in en+1 | ⌫ | t
! en+1 | ⌫ [ {x1 7! e1,...,xn 7! en} | t + 1
(E-Var1)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1
(x | ⌫ [ {x 7! e1} | t)! (x | ⌫0 [ {x 7! e01} | t + 1)
x /2 domain(⌫) [ domain(⌫0)
(E-Var2) (x | ⌫ [ {x 7! v} | t)! (v | ⌫ [ {x 7! v} | t + 1)
3.3.5 Triggers
STEP provides a trigger construct to specify repetitive conditional evaluation. It repeatedly evaluates
a boolean expression until it is true and then evaluates a second expression (the first expression “triggers”
the second). We also provide the ability to provide sequential let-bindings that behave as though they
are within the scope of each trigger expression evaluation (i.e., the let-term is recomputed on every
expansion of the trigger) are are available to both branches of the trigger (a single let-binding result
spans both trigger arguments).
We define the trigger’s repetition recursively, via the conditional. For completeness we also define
functionally degenerate trigger forms; expressions that specify a constant value for the trigger predicate
produce a superfluous trigger expression (i.e., trigger true e1 always reduces to e1 while trigger
false e1 would never proceed).
(E-Trigger1)
trigger e1 e2 | ⌫ | t
! cond e1 e2 (trigger e1 e2)| ⌫ | t + 1
(E-TriggerDeg)
e2 | ⌫ | t ! e02 | ⌫0 | t + 1
trigger v e2 | ⌫ | t ! cond v e02 (trigger v e2)| ⌫0 | t + 1
The letonce expression shown is syntactic sugar for the expanded trigger expression, which builds
a sequential set of variable assignments for which there is one one expansion per trigger iteration (alpha
renaming ensures we are not using the same variable in every iteration). The binding is intentionally
placed at the scope of both the predicate and the conclusion (i.e., consequent) of the trigger term.
letonce {x1=e1,...,xn=en} in trigger en+1 en+2 ⌘ trigger {x1=e1,. . .,xn=en} en+1 en+2
3Put di↵erently, the multiple assignments in E-LetN are not syntactic sugar for nested lets.
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(E-TriggerLet)
trigger {x1=e1,. . .,xn=en} en+1 en+2
! let {x1=e1,. . .,xn=en} in
cond en+1 en+2 (trigger {x1=e1,. . .,xn =en} en+1 en+2)
3.4 Syntax of Types
The syntax of types in Core STEP are given below.
t ::= base types
Int | Bool | Img
⌧p ::= primitive types
t{s,s} w/ size annotation
⌧ ::= types
⌧p primitive type
Sensor ⌧b sensor
⌧ ! ⌧ opcode
s ::= n | r size annotation
3.5 Static Semantics and Sizing of Types
The typing (static semantic) of an expression takes the general form:
  ` e : t{smin,smax} $c,
Where t is base type (e.g., Int , Bool , Img ), {smin, smax} is the size annotation for the type (smin is
the lower size bound, smax is the upper size bound)4, c is the worst-case approximation of computational
cost of the expression and  is a size constraint set (smax and smin are size annotations constrained by
the simple equations stored in , as we will see later). In English we read this as: “Expression e and
has a worst-case computational cost of c and is of type t under the typing environment  , where t has
a minimum size smin, a maximum size smax, and is subject to size constraints .”
For clarity of presentation we denote size annotations with di↵erent symbols depending on the base
type they annotate. We use ni to represent a size annotation for an Integer, and ri for a size annotation
on an Image. In our presentation we omit the implicit constraint s1  s2 present for every size vector
{s1, s2},
3.5.1 Primitive Types
The typing rules for values are given below. The computational cost (c) for a value is always 0.
(T-Int)
  ` n : Int {n,n} $ 0, {n = n}
A constant integer value has both size annotation variables constrained to the integer’s actual value.
4This pair can be expanded to a tuple to track more dimensions/aspects, as described in Section 5
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(T-Image)
  ` i : Img {r,r} $ 0, {r = resolutionof (i)}
The size of an image is given by its resolution, taken logically to be the number of pixels in the Image,
however to simplify our presentation we use only the width of the image. The pair specifies the range
of possible resolutions for the image; As with integers, both values will be the same for a specific,
concrete instantiation of an Image.
(T-Bool)
  ` b : Bool $ 0,?
A boolean (true | false) has a negligible fixed size and thus its size annotation is omitted (i.e., {1,1}).
We define some convenience functions to manipulate the type and its size annotation :
minsize (t{n1,n2}) = n1 maxsize (t{n1,n2}) = n2
base (t{n1,n2}) = t
For example: minsize (Int {4,8}) = 4 base (Int {4,8}) = Int maxsize (Img {2,n}) = n
3.5.2 Subtyping (bounding sizes)
(S-Refl) ⌧ < : ⌧ (S-Trans)
⌧1 < : ⌧2 ⌧2 < : ⌧3
⌧1 < : ⌧3
(S-Arrow)
⌧2 < : ⌧1 ⌧ 01 < : ⌧ 02
⌧1 ! ⌧ 01 < : ⌧2 ! ⌧ 02
(S-Pair)
⌧1 < : ⌧2 ⌧ 01 < : ⌧ 02
{⌧1 ⇥ ⌧ 01} < : {⌧2 ⇥ ⌧ 02}
(S-Sensor)
⌧1 < : ⌧2
Sensor ⌧1 < : Sensor ⌧2
We define a relation similar to [LH96]’s subtyping relation (⇥) which allows a weakening of the type
to increase a size bound, in order to provide an upper bound of the size of the input relative to work
to be completed. In our environment we notice that the correctness of Image processing functions may
impacted by the size of the input (i.e., resolution of the image); as such we cannot arbitrarily increase
the logical size (resolution) of this data without adverse consequences to functional correctness.
The need to track the lower bound extends into all aspects of the sized typing system, so we use a
general sizing/weaken rule (S-Sized) to describe the subtype relationship for specific sized types.
(S-Sized)
(smin   s0min) (smax  s0max)
t{smin,smax} < : t{s0min,s0max}
Finally, we give the rule for weakening via the subtype relation, which should be clear when considered
with S-Sized, above. Notice the constraint set  grows to include the sizing relationship between ⌧1
and ⌧2. If one were to expand the sizing pair to include more dimensions/aspects of type size, then the
S-Sized and T-Weaken constraints would be augmented to support the new sizing logic (Section 5
has more on this).
(T-Weaken)
  ` e : ⌧1 $ c, ⌧1 < : ⌧2
  ` e : ⌧2 $ c, [ 2
where 2 = {minsize (⌧2)  minsize (⌧1), maxsize (⌧2)   maxsize (⌧1)}
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3.5.3 Conditional
(T-Cond)
  ` e1 : Bool $ c1,1   ` e2 : ⌧ $ c2,2   ` e3 : ⌧ $ c3,3
  ` cond e1 e2 e3 : ⌧ $ 1 + c1 + max(c2 c3),1 [ 2 [ 3
In the (common) event where terms of the conditional branches are di↵erent sizes, the application
of weaken can be used to relax the bounds on either side to meet at the lower minimum size and larger
maximum size.
In the event that either branch’s type contains a size variable, each branch may be weakened to a
new, common size variable for the conditional. The example that follows portrays exactly this, in which
two images (or expressions of type image) that have di↵erent, yet unknown sizes that are supplied as
the branches of a conditional only after applying T-Weaken to each to arrive at the new size variables
n5 and n6:
...
b : Bool $c0,0
i1 : Img
{r1,r2} $ c1,1
(T-Weaken)
i1 : Img
{r5,r6} $ c1,1 [ 01
i2 : Img
{r3,r4} $ c2,
(T-Weaken)
i2 : Img
{r5,r6} $ c2, [ 02 (T-Cond)
cond b i1 i2 : Img
{r5,r6}$ c0 + max (c1, c2),0 [ 1 [ 01 [ 2 [ 02
where:
01 = {r5  r1, r6   r2}
02 = {r5  r3, r6   r4}
3.5.4 Sensors
A Sensor is a “container” type; a sensor of type Sensor ⌧ will return values of type ⌧ when “read”. The
Sensor type has an negligible, omitted static size, however the inner (contained) type can be annotated
with size bounds to indicate the capabilities of the sensor (e.g., the range of resolutions a camera can
support). The rule below indicates that image is an image sensor that can return images ranging in
size from rmin to rmax (that should correlate with the maximum and minimum resolution capabilities
of physical hardware). As this judgment has no premise and introduces the size variables r1 and r2 into
the derivation tree, we will solve our constraint set for these variables once type derivation is complete.
(T-ImageSensor)
  ` image : Sensor Img {r1,r2} $ 0, {r1   rmin} [ {x2  rmax}
The time sensor returns the number of evaluations (computations) since the beginning of the evalu-
ation.
(T-TimeSensor)
  ` time : Sensor Int {n1,n2} $ 0, {n1   0}
(T-SensorRead)
type (get) = Sensor ⌧1 ! ⌧1   ` e1 : Sensor ⌧1 $ c,1
  ` get e1 : ⌧1 $ c1 + 1 + latentcost (get,maxsize (⌧1)),
3.5.5 Opcodes
(T-Op)
type (op) = ⌧1 ! ⌧2 constr (op) = 
  ` op : ⌧1 ! ⌧2 $ 0,
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(T-OpApply)
  ` op : ⌧1 ! ⌧2 $ 0,1   ` e2 : ⌧1 $ c,2
  ` op e2 : ⌧2 $ 1 + c+ latentcost (op,maxsize (⌧1)),1 [ 2
where op 2 {op1 | op2 | op3 | . . .}
The latentcost () function [RG94] returns the discretized computational cost of each opcode as an
equation of the size of its input. For example, the complexity of finding a face in an image is a function
of the total number of pixels in the image.
3.5.6 Let binding
An instance of a variable has whatever type is assumed for it in the typing environment  . A variable
has no computational cost or constraints associated with it, rather the costs and constraints are assigned
when variables are bound (i.e., in the let term).
(T-Var)
 (x) = ⌧
  ` x : ⌧ $ 0,?
In a let term, we take the sum of the costs of the let-bound expressions as well as the union of all
of their associated constraints.
(T-LetN)
  ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1 . . .   ` en : ⌧n $ cn,n  , x1 : ⌧1, . . . , xn : ⌧n ` en+1 : ⌧n+1 $ cn+1,n+1
  ` let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in en+1 : ⌧n+1 $ cn+1 +Pni=1 ci,n+1 [Sni=1 i
The cost defined in this rule is an over-estimate of the total cost as the let-bound symbols (some xi)
may not occur in the evaluation path of en+1. These costs will not, however, be “charged” twice, as a
variable itself has cost zero when computing the cost of en+1.
3.5.7 Triggers
A trigger’s cost and constraint takes much the same form as the cond and let instances from which the
trigger is derived.
(T-Trig)
  ` ei : ⌧i $ci,i (for i 2 1..n)  , {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+1 : Bool $cn+1,n+1  , {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+2 : ⌧ $cn+2,n+2
  ` trigger {xi=ei}1..nen+1 en+2 : ⌧ $ T ⇤ (cn+1 +
Pn
i=1 ci) + cn+2,n+1 [ n+2 [
Sn
i=1 i
where T is a new cost variable from the set of unused cost variables, C
Specific values for T may be provided by explicit user bounds or other means.
3.5.8 Typing of the Let-store, ⌫
We can assign a type (more accurately sequence of types) to a variable store ⌫ if we have assumed types
for all of the variables contained within the store. Similarly we associate a cost and constraint set with
the store (for use in interim steps of typing derivations).
(T-Nu)
 , 0 ` ⌫(xi) :  0(xi) $ ci,i (for every xi 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))
  ` ⌫ :  0 $ Pni=1 ci,Sni=1 i
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Finally we can combine an expression and a typed variable store into a typed pair by discharging
the typing assumptions of the variable store, as shown below.
(T-Complete)
  ` e : ⌧ $ c1,1 ? ` ⌫ :   $c2,2
? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c1 + c2,1 [ 2
3.6 Soundness of Core STEP
This Section proves Soundness for the Core STEP (Soundness = Progress+Preservation). Progress
means that every expression is either a value or can take an evaluative step (i.e., expressions don’t get
stuck), while Preservation means that every typed expression that takes an evaluative step results in
another typed expression (i.e., evaluation is type preserving). We begin by proving some Lemmas that
will be useful for our proofs of Progress and Preservation.
3.6.1 Lemma: L-Var
Suppose ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = xi, then for some c0 and 0:
? ` ⌫(xi) | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0
Proof: By the structure of the derivation of ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, where e = xi.
 (xi) = ⌧ (T-Var)
  ` xi : ⌧ $ 0,?
  ` ⌫(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j (for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))(T-Nu)
? ` ⌫ :   $ c,
(T-Complete)
? ` xi | ⌫ :  (xi) $ c,
From the premise of T-Nu:   ` ⌫(xi) :  (xi) $ ci,i
From the premise of T-Var:  (xi) = ⌧
Combining these we have:   ` ⌫(xi) : ⌧ $ ci,i
  ` ⌫(xi) : ⌧ $ ci,i ? ` ⌫ :   $ c,
(T-Complete)
? ` ⌫(xi) | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0
3.6.2 Lemma(s): Inversion+⌫
Suppose ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, is the last judgment J0 in a typing derivation tree D. Then:
(1) The left premise of this judgment in D is   ` e : ⌧$c000,000 (say J1) for some c000 and 000
(2) If J2 is a premise of J1 of the form  0 ` e0 : ⌧ 0$c0,0 for some c0,0 then  0 ` e0 | ⌫ : ⌧ 0$c0,0
can be derived for all such J2.
Proof: (Generic) By the structure of the derivation of ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, (below). In the general
form, to have reached ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c,, we must have an application of T-Complete with right-side
premise ? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00 and on the left side of the derivation we find the individual sub-premises to
type the expression e. We call this rule T-Rule as a placeholder for specific instances of e and similarly
denote the sub-premises as J2 and the consequent (in which e is given a type) as J1. We can apply
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T-Complete with the right hand side premise of the existing T-Complete to each sub-premise of J2
individually to arrive at our conclusion. We detail the specific individual cases below.
J2
(T-Rule)
J1 =   ` e : ⌧$c000,000
  ` ⌫(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j (for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))
(T-Nu)
? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00
(T-Complete)
J0 = ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c,
Case L-Cond:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = cond e1 e2 e3 then for some c01, c02, c03 and 01,02,03:
? ` e1 | ⌫ : Bool $ c01,01
? ` e2 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c02,02
? ` e3 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c03,03
Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` e1 : Bool $ c1,1   ` e2 : ⌧ $ c2,2   ` e3 : ⌧ $ c3,3
J1 =   ` cond e1 e2 e3 : ⌧ $ (1 + c1 + (max)(c2, c3))), (1 [ 2 [ 3)
T-Rule = T-Cond.
Case L-Get:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = get e1 then for some c01 and 01:
? ` e1 | ⌫ : Sensor ⌧1 $ c01,01
Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` e1 : Sensor ⌧1 $ c1,1
J1 =   ` get e1 : ⌧1 $ c001 ,001
T-Rule = T-SensorRead.
Case L-OpApply:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = op e2 then for some c01, c02 and 01, kappa02:
? ` op | ⌫ : ⌧1 ! ⌧2$ c01,01
? ` e2 | ⌫ : ⌧1 $ c02,02
Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` op : ⌧1 ! ⌧2$ 0,1   ` e2 : ⌧1 $ c,2
J1 =   ` op e2 : ⌧$c,1 [ 2
T-Rule = T-OpApply.
Case L-LetN:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in en+1 then for some c01 . . . c0n+1 and 01 . . .0n+1:
? ` e1 | ⌫ : ⌧1 $ c01,01
...
? ` en | ⌫ : ⌧n $ c0n,0n
?, x1 : ⌧1, . . . , xn : ⌧n ` en+1 | ⌫ : ⌧n+1 $ c0n+1,0n+1
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Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1 . . .   ` en : ⌧n $ cn,n  , x1 : ⌧1, . . . , xn : ⌧n ` en+1 :
⌧n+1 $ cn+1,n+1
J1 =   ` let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in en+1 : ⌧ $ cn+1 +
Pn
i=1 ci,n+1 [
Sn
i=1 i
T-Rule = T-LetN.
Case L-Trigger:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = trigger {xi=ei}i21..nen+1 en+2 then for some c01 . . . c0n+2 and 01 . . .0n+2:
? ` e1 | ⌫ : ⌧1 $ c01,01
. . .
? ` en | ⌫ : ⌧n $ c0n,0n
?, {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+1 | ⌫ : Bool $ c0n+1,0n+1
?, {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+2 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0n+2,0n+2
Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1 . . .   ` en : ⌧n $ cn,n  , {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+1 :
Bool $ cn+1,n+1  , {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+2 : ⌧ $ cn+2,n+2
J1 =   ` trigger {xi=ei}i21..nen+1 en+2 : ⌧ $ T ⇤ (cn+1 +
Pn
i=1 ci) + cn+2,n+1 [
n+2 [
Sn
i=1 i
T-Rule = T-Trig.
3.6.3 Theorem [Progress]
Suppose e | ⌫ is closed and ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, (for some cost c and constraint set )
Either: (1) e is a value or (2) there exists some e0 and store ⌫0 such that for every
t :
(e | ⌫ | t) ! (e0 | ⌫0 | t + 1).
Proof: By induction on the number of unique sub-derivations of a typing derivation of ? ` e | ⌫ :
⌧ $ c,.
We proceed by analysis of the shape of e to show that the property holds for the larger derivation.
Case e = v:
Satisfied trivially as these terms are values.
Case e = cond e1 e2 e3:
Applying the Induction Hypothesis to a derivation whose final judgment is   ` e1 | ⌫ :
Bool $ c1,1 (v ia L-Cond) we can verify that progress holds for e1 | ⌫ (i.e., e1 is a value or
e1 | ⌫ can take an evaluative step). So either (1) e1 is a value (specifically, a Boolean) and
E-IfTrue or E-IfFalse can be applied or e1 | ⌫ can take an evaluative step such that E-If
applies and (e | ⌫ | t)! (cond e01 e2 e3 | ⌫0 | t + 1).
Case e = xi with xi : ⌧i and xi 2 Domain (⌫) (as e | ⌫ is closed):
By the definition of ⌫ (and closure of the pair e | ⌫) we re-write ? ` xi | ⌫ : ⌧ as ? ` xi |
{xi 7! ei} [ ⌫+ : ⌧ . By the definition of ⌫ either ei = vi and E-Var applies without premise
or ei is a composite expression. To apply E-Var1 we require progress for ei | ⌫. By the
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definition of ⌫ we can re-write ei as ⌫(xi) for which progress holds via L-Var (to which we
apply the the Inductive Hypothesis). Hence E-Var or E-Var1 may be applied and progress
holds for this term.
Case e = let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in en+1:
E-LetN takes an evaluative step without premise such that (e | ⌫ | t)! (en+1 | ⌫ [ {x1 7!
e1,...,xn 7! en} | t + 1).
Case e =trigger {x1=e1,. . .,xn=en} en+1 en+2:
E-TriggerLet applies without premise for a single step of evaluation.
In the event that the let assignment set is empty (i.e., e =trigger en+1 en+2) then E-
Trigger1 applies without premise.
Case e = get e1:
Either e1 is a value and E-GetApply applies (or E-GetTime if e1 = time), or by L-Get
and the Inductive Hypothesis, we show progress holds on (e1 | ⌫) so e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫0 | t+1
and E-Get1 applies such that (e | ⌫ | t)! (get e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1)
Case e = op e2:
Either e2 is a value and E-OpApply applies, or by L-OpApply and the Inductive Hypoth-
esis, progress holds on e2 | ⌫ so e2 | ⌫ | t ! e02 | ⌫0 | t + 1 and E-Op1 applies such that
(e | ⌫ | t)! (op e02 | ⌫0 | t + 1)
3.6.4 Theorem [Preservation]
Suppose e | ⌫ is closed and ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c,.
If (e | ⌫ | t) ! (e0 | ⌫0 | t + 1), then for some cost c0 and constraint set 0:
? ` e0 | ⌫0 : ⌧ $ c0,0
Proof: By induction on the number of distinct sub-derivations of a typing derivation of ? ` e | ⌫ :
⌧ $ c,.
We proceed by analysis of the shape of e to show that the property holds for the larger derivation.
Case e = v:
These cases are satisfied trivially, as these terms are values and do not make a further eval-
uative step.
Case e = cond e1 e2 e3:
We consider each possible evaluative case, individually.
Case E-IfTrue:
(cond true e2 e3 | ⌫ | t)! (e2 | ⌫ | t + 1)
We consider the typing derivation of e | ⌫ in which we have   ` e2 : ⌧ $ c2,2 (from
the premise T-Cond) and ⌫ :   $ c00,00 (from the premise T-Complete). We
combine them in a new application of T-Complete to verify ? ` e2 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0.
Case E-IfFalse:
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(cond false e2 e3 | ⌫ | t)! (e3 | ⌫ | t + 1)
We consider the typing derivation of e | ⌫ in which we have   ` e3 : ⌧ $ c3,3 (from
the premise T-Cond) and ⌫ :   $ c00,00 (from the premise T-Complete). We
combine them in a new application of T-Complete to verify ? ` e3 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0.
Case E-If:
(cond e1 e2 e3 | ⌫ | t)! (cond e01 e2 e3 | ⌫0 | t + 1)
By the premise of T-Cond e1 : Bool and by L-Cond e1 | ⌫ : Bool . By applying
the Inductive Hypothesis to a judgment with this as its last term, we obtain e01 |
⌫0 : Bool .
Looking at the typing derivation of e01 | ⌫0 : Bool :
g = (  ` e01 : Bool $ c1,1)
  ` ⌫(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j (for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))
(T-Nu)
h = (? ` ⌫0 :   $ c00,00)
(T-Complete)
? ` e01 | ⌫0 : Bool $ c01,01
Now we apply T-Cond to g and the terms from the derivation of cond e1 e2 e3 | ⌫
(if needed, see ↵ in L-Cond for clarity):
  ` e01 : Bool $ c1,1   ` e2 : ⌧ $ c2,2   ` e3 : ⌧ $ c3,3 (T-Cond)
i = (  ` cond e01 e2 e3 : ⌧ $ c04,04)
Now we apply T-Complete to h and i to verify: ? ` cond e01 e2 e3 | ⌫0 : ⌧ $ c0,0
Case e = xi with xi : ⌧i and xi 2 Domain (⌫) (as e | ⌫ is closed):
By the definition of ⌫ (and closure of the pair e | ⌫) we rewrite ` xi | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0 as ` xi |
{xi 7! ⌫(xi)} [ ⌫+ : ⌧ $ c0,0. We now consider the possible evaluation cases individually:
Case E-Var1 (⌫(xi) = vi) :
(xi | {xi 7! vi} [ ⌫+ | t)! (vi | {xi 7! vi} [ ⌫+ | t + 1)
We know from the derivation of e | ⌫, the premise of T-Nu gives   ` ⌫(xi) :
⌧i $ ci,i. As ⌫(xi) = vi and  (xi) = ⌧i = ⌧ we can re-write this as g = (  ` vi :
⌧ $ ci,i).
Again from the derivation we also have the premise of T-Complete: h = (? `
⌫ :   $ c00,00). Combining g and h under T-Complete we can verify ` vi | ⌫ :
⌧ $ c0,0 = ` e0 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0.
Case E-Var2 (⌫(xi) = ei):
(xi | {xi 7! ei} [ ⌫+ | t)! (xi | {xi 7! e0i} [ ⌫0+ | t + 1)
L-Var gives us (? ` ⌫(xi) | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0), which we rewrite by the definition of
⌫ as (? ` ei | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0). Applying the Inductive Hypothesis we have that
(? ` e0i | ⌫0 : ⌧ $ c000,000). From the typing derivation of this expression we have a
right side premise for T-Complete: h = (? ` ⌫0 :   $ c00,00). Combining h with
our prior left hand premise of T-Complete, the T-Var’s   ` xi : ⌧ $ 0,?, we
have:
` xi | ⌫0 : ⌧ $ c0,0 = ` e0 | ⌫0 : ⌧ $ c0,0.
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Case e = let {x1 =e1,...,xn =en} in en+1:
Case E-LetN:
(let {x1 =e1,...,xn =en} in en+1 | ⌫ | t) ! (en+1 | ⌫ [ {x1 7! e1,...,xn 7!
en} | t + 1)
Thus our goal is to type: en+1 | ⌫ [ {x1 7! e1, . . . , xn 7! en}
We first refer to the typing derivation of e | ⌫ (and define aliases to save space):
g = (  ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1 . . .   ` en : ⌧n $ cn,n)
h = ( , x1 : ⌧1, . . . , xn : ⌧n ` en+1 : ⌧n+1 $ cn+1,n+1)
Y =
g h
(T-LetN)
  ` let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in en+1 : ⌧n+1 $ cn+1 +
Pn
i=1 ci,n+1 [
Sn
i=1 i
Y
i = (  ` ⌫(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))
(T-Nu)
? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00
(T-Complete)
? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧$ c1,1
We call ⌫1 = {x1 7! e1, . . . , xn 7! en} and call to g and h show that each ⌫1(xi) :
 (xi) for xi 2 Domain (⌫1). We see ⌫0 = ⌫ [ ⌫1 and now we have what we need to
apply T-Complete and show our desired result.
h
  ` ⌫0(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫0))
(T-Nu)
? ` ⌫0 :   $ c00,00
(T-Complete)
? ` en+1 | ⌫0 : ⌧$ c0,0
Case e = trigger e1 e2:
Case E-Trigger1:
(trigger e1 e2 | ⌫ | t)! (cond e1 e2 (trigger e1 e2) | ⌫ | t + 1)
From the typing derivation of e | ⌫ we have e1 : Bool , e2 : ⌧ , e : ⌧ , and ? ` ⌫ :
  $ c00,00. We combine the first three under T-Cond and the result with the last
under T-Complete to obtain our desired result.
Case E-TriggerDeg:
(trigger v1 e2 | ⌫ | t)! (cond v1 e2 (trigger e1 e2) | ⌫ | t + 1)
Identical to the above.
Case e = trigger {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} en+1 en+2:
Case E-TriggerLet:
(trigger {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} en+1 en+2 | ⌫ | t)
! (let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in (cond en+1 en+2 e) | ⌫ | t + 1)
From the typing derivation of e | ⌫ we have en+1 : Bool , en+2 : ⌧ , and e : ⌧ . We
combine these under T-Cond, the result with the variable premises under T-LetN
and finally this with ? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00 under T-Complete to obtain our desired
result.
A Type System For Safe SN Resource Allocation 21
Case e = op e1:
Case E-OpApply:
(op v1 | ⌫ | t) ! (v2 | ⌫ | t + 1) The function Apply by definition, returns a
value (which is inherently typed). By the typing derivation of op v1 | ⌫ we find
? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00 and can apply T-Complete to obtain our desired result.
Case E-Op1:
(op e1 | ⌫ | t)! (op e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1)
By the premise of T-OpApply e1 : ⌧1 and by L-OpApply e1 | ⌫ : ⌧1. By the
Inductive Hypothesis we have e01 | ⌫0 : ⌧1.
Looking at the typing derivation of e01 | ⌫0 : ⌧1:
g = (  ` e01 : ⌧1$ c1,1) h = (? ` ⌫0 :   $ c00,00)(T-Complete)
? ` e01 | ⌫0 : ⌧1$ c0,0
Now we apply T-OpApply to g and the terms from the derivation of op e1 | ⌫ (if
needed, see ↵ in L-OpApply for clarity):
  ` op : ⌧1 ! ⌧2$ c1,1   ` e01 : ⌧1 $ c2,2 (T-OpApply)
i = (  ` op e01 : ⌧2 $ c0,0)
Now we apply T-Complete to h and i to verify: ? ` op e01 | ⌫0 : ⌧ $ c000,000
Case e = get e1:
Case E-GetApply:
(get v1 | ⌫ | t)! (v2 | ⌫ | t + 1)
The function get by definition, returns a value (which is inherently typed). By
the typing derivation of get v1 | ⌫ we find ? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00 and can apply
T-Complete to obtain our desired result.
Case E-Get1:
(get e1 | ⌫ | t)! (get e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1)
By the premise of T-SensorRead e1 : Sensor ⌧1 and by L-Get e1 | ⌫ : Sensor ⌧1.
By the Inductive Hypothesis we have e01 | ⌫0 : Sensor ⌧1.
Looking at the typing derivation of e01 | ⌫0 : Sensor ⌧1:
g = (  ` e01 : Sensor ⌧1$ c1,1) h = (? ` ⌫0 :   $ c00,00)(T-Complete)
? ` e01 | ⌫0 : Sensor ⌧1$ c0,0
Now we apply T-SensorRead to g and the terms from the derivation of get e1 | ⌫
(if needed, see ↵ in L-Get for clarity):
  ` get : Sensor ⌧1 ! ⌧1$ c1,1   ` e01 : Sensor ⌧1 $ c2,2 (T-SensorRead)
i = (  ` get e01 : ⌧1 $ c0,0)
Now we apply T-Complete to h and i to verify: ? ` get e01 | ⌫0 : ⌧1 $ c000,000
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4 Applications of the formalism
In this section we present concrete instantiations of the formalism presented in the previous section, in
order to illustrate its benefit.
4.1 Additional Syntax
In addition to defining specific primitive operators (Opcodes) we also define the notion of a pair to allow
these operators to accept multiple inputs.
e ::= expressions
{e,e} pair
ft flowtypes
v ::= values
{v,v} pair
op ::= opcodes
fst first projection of a pair
snd second projection of a pair
sizedimage allocate an image sensor (supporting specific sizes)
add add integers
facect count faces in an image
resample change the resolution of an image
ft ::= flowtypes
deadline n e define a timing constraint
⌧ ::= types
⌧ ⇥ ⌧ pair
4.2 Typing and Evaluation Rules for Pairs
Evaluation (strict) and typing rules for pairs are handled in a standard way.
(T-PairCons)
  ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1   ` e2 : ⌧2 $ c2,2
  ` {e1, e2} : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 $ 1 + c1 + c2,1 [ 2
(T-PairFirst)
  ` fst : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 ! ⌧1 $ 0,?   ` e : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 $ c,
  ` fst e : ⌧1 $ 1 + c,
(T-PairSecond)
  ` snd : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 ! ⌧2 $ 0,?   ` e : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 $ c,
  ` snd e : ⌧2 $ 1 + c,
(E-PairFst) fst {v1, v2} | ⌫ | t ! v1 | ⌫ | t (E-PairSnd) snd {v1, v2} | ⌫ | t ! v2 | ⌫ | t
(E-Pair1)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫0 | t + 1
{e1, e2} | ⌫ | t ! {e01, e2} | ⌫0 | t + 1
(E-Pair2)
e2 | ⌫ | t ! e02 | ⌫0 | t + 1
{v1, e2} | ⌫ | t ! {v1, e02} | ⌫0 | t + 1
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4.3 Additional Typing Rules for Image Manipulation
Operations that manipulate images may explicitly specify a range of valid input sizes (i.e., size con-
straints) on their input to ensure correct processing. In the example below, the face count opcode
requires that its input be in the size range of 320 to 1024 (using manageable image widths as a size
rather than actual total numbers of pixels which fall in the millions of pixels). The definitions of these
opcodes implicitly combine an aspect of T-Weaken, by using size ranges (rather than single values) in
their constrained size variables. This alternate approach has a distinct advantage over using T-Weaken
prior to T-OpApply (as is done in the Conditional in Section 3.5.3); namely the size and cost bounds
are more accurate if they are computed against the input’s actual size bound instead of weakened size
bounds. It should be obvious to the reader that the latentcost values for the functions in this section
have also been contrived in a manner to ease the presentation and discussion.
(T-FaceCt)
type (facect) = Img {r1,r2} ! Int {n1,n2} constr (facect) = 1
facect : Img {r1,r2} ! Int {n1,n2} $ 0,1
1 = {r1   320, r2  1024}
latentcost (facect, ⌧) = (maxsize (⌧)/2)
A resampling operation is analogous to casting an image to be of a di↵erent size.5 It has no explicit
values for the size variables of its input. Its only constraint is that the input be of some positive size
(greater than zero).
(T-Resample)
type (resample) = Int {n1,n2} ⇥ Img {r1,r2} ! Img {r3,r4} constr (resample) = 1
resample : Int {n1,n2} ⇥ Img {r1,r2} ! Img {r3,r4} $ 0,1
1 = {n1 > 0, r1 > 0, r3 = r1 ⇤ n1, r4 = r2 ⇤ n2}
latentcost (resample, ⌧) = (maxsize (⌧)/8)
Image sensing hardware (e.g., a web camera) has the capability to capture images in a range of pos-
sible resolutions. While the sized annotation makes sizing explicit in the type system, our programming
language lacks explicit type annotation within its syntax. Thus, we formally define a new primitive to
allocate a new image sensor (ala image) that accepts a resolution range explicitly, as an argument.
(T-SizedImage)
type (sizedimage) = ⌧ ! Sensor Img {r1,r2} constr (sizedimage) = 1
sizedimage : ⌧ ! Sensor Img {r1,r2} $ 0,1
⌧ = Int {n1,n2} ⇥ Int {n3,n4}
1 = {n1 > 0, n3 > 0, r1   min (n1, n3), r2  max (n2, n4)}
latentcost (sizedimage, ⌧) = (maxsize (⌧)/8)
5While a resampling operation does increase the number of pixels in an image, it does not improve image quality. We will
return to this issue in Section 5.
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4.4 Flowtypes
Finally we introduce a new function whose sole purpose is to inject run-time constraints (a Flowtype in
our nomenclature). This function annotates that its argument has an explicit deadline within the type
system. For example, the example with function period() from the Introduction would be implemented
as syntactic sugar using deadline().
(T-Deadline)
  ` n : Int {n,n}$ 0,1   ` e2 : ⌧ $ c2,2
  ` deadline n e2 : ⌧ $ c2,1 [ 2 [ 3
where 3 = {c2  n}
(E-Deadline) (deadline n e2 | ⌫ | t)! (e2 | ⌫ | t)
4.5 In Practice
In this section we have expanded our core language as much as possible so as to reflect our real operating
and tasking environment. We will now construct several examples on which we apply our type system.
Inferring Optimal Image Resolution
In practice, a user may not provide a specific resolution (size) bound for images that are used as part
of a larger computation in which the image is not part of the desired output. For example, a user who
wishes to determine whether or not a light is on in a particular o ce is interested in a boolean result,
not the intermediate image used to generate this result. As image sensors are able to capture images in
a range of possible resolutions, our type system can use its size constraint system to suggest an optimal
resolution, a range of feasible resolutions, or indicate that there is no feasible solution for the program
as specified.
Example 1:
Face counting within an image from an image sensor with no explicit size bounds: facect(get(image))
D0 =
type (get) = Sensor ⌧ ! ⌧
(T-ImageSensor)
image : Sensor Img {r1,r2} $ 0,1
(T-SensorRead)
get(image) : Img {r1,r2} $ c1,1
D1 =
type (facect) = Img {r1,r2} ! Int {n1,n2} constr (facect) = 2
(T-FaceCt)
facect : Img {r1,r2} ! Int {n1,n2} $ 0,2 D0
(T-OpApply)
facect(get(image)) : Int {n1,n2} $ c2,1 [ 2
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c1 = 1 + latentcost (get, r2) = 1 + (r2/8)
c2 = 1 + c1 + latentcost (facect, r2) = 1 + c1 + r2/2
1 = {r1   rmin, r2  rmax}
2 = {r1   320, r2  1024}
Solving the constraints for r1 and r2 (we minimize r1 and maximize r2 subject to the constraints
given above, we determine the simple constraints that the resolution of the image to manipulate, and
thus the sensor itself, fall in the range [320, 1024]. Thus the SSD may allocate any available sensor that
can produce images within this range of resolutions. A camera that can capture images at resolutions
ranging from 1024 to 4096 is valid for this service fragment (provided it samples at 1024), as is a camera
that can capture images at the range from 320 to 512.
Bear in mind that the minimum resolution in a range of resolutions is not always the most desirable
value; while the minimum will consume the least computational resources, it may do so at the expense of
computation confidence (e.g., it may not be possible to detect all the faces in an image if the resolution is
too small). As a result we advocate the use of the maximum size, provided there are resources available
to accommodate the additional processing overhead. This processing overhead is easily measured by the
cost function (c2, in the above).
Example 2:
Face counting within an image from an image sensor with no explicit size bounds with an explicit
deadline: deadline 322 facect (get(image))
(T-Int)
322 : Int {n,n} $ 0,0 D1
(T-Deadline)
deadline 322 facect(get(image)) : Int {n1,n2} $ c2,0 [ 1 [ 2 [ 3
c1 = 1 + latentcost (get, r2) = 1 + (r2/8)
c2 = 1 + c1 + latentcost (facect, r2) = 1 + c1 + r2/2
1 = {r1   rmin, r2  rmax}
2 = {r1   320, r2  1024}
0 = {n = 322}
3 = {c2  322}
In this example the valid range for capture is no longer [320, 1024], when we solve for r1 and r2 we
are limited to the range [320, 512] as larger values of r2 would exceed the constraint imposed by 3.
It is worth noting that, despite slight di↵erences in the typing derivation, this example has a size
bound result that is identical to an example with explicit (user-specified) size bounds that are the same
as those imposed by the facect opcode (deadline 322 facect(get(sizedimage({320, 1024})))).
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Example 3:
Face counting within an image from an image sensor with no explicit size bounds as the response in a
trigger expression: trigger e0 facect(get(image))
We assume the presence of a Boolean typed expression e0 with cost c0 and constraint set 0.
e0 : Bool $ c0,0 D1
(T-Trig)
trigger e0 facect(get(image)) : Int {n1,n2} $ c3,0 [ 1 [ 2
c1 = 1 + latentcost (get, r2) = 1 + (r2/8)
c2 = 1 + c1 + latentcost (facect, r2) = 1 + c1 + r2/2
1 = {r1   rmin, r2  rmax}
2 = {r1   320, r2  1024}
c3 = (T ⇤ c0) + c2
If expression e0 starts running at time tstart, transitions to true at time ttrue, and delay (e0) is the
time to evaluate e0 then we can write: T = d ttrue tstartdelay (e0) e. Recognizing that c0 is a delay (bound) for e0,
we can express this as T = d ttrue c2c0 e. This example underscores the correctly bounding (or estimating)
the “weight” of T is dependent on estimating the factors required to cause e0 to transition to true,
which may include information about the sensing environment E and costs determined elsewhere in the
derivation (i.e., to supply tstart).
Example 4:
Face counting within a resampled image, originally captured from an image sensor with no explicit size
bounds: facect (resample {4, get(image) })
D2 =
4 : Int {n,n} $0, {n = 4} D0
(T-PairCons)
{4, get(image)} : Int {n,n} ⇥ Img {r1,r2} $ c1,1 [ {n = 4}
D3 =
type (resample) = Int {n,n} ⇥ Img {r1,r2} ! Img {r3,r4} constr (resample) = 2
(T-Resample)
resample : Int {n,n} ⇥ Img {r1,r2} ! Img {r3,r4} $ 0,2
D4 =
D2 D3
(T-OpApply)
resample {4, get(image) } : Img {r3,r4} $ c2,1 [ 2 [ {n = 4}
type (facect) = Img {r3,r4} ! Int {n3,n4} constr (facect) = 1
(T-FaceCt)
facect : Img {r3,r4} ! Int {n3,n4} $ 0,3 D4
(T-OpApply)
facect (resample {4, get(image) }) : Int {n3,n4} $ c3,4
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c1 = 1 + latentcost (get, r2) = 1 + (r2/8)
c2 = latentcost (resample)+ c1
c3 = latentcost (facect)+ c2
1 = {r1   rmin, r2  rmax}
2 = {n > 0, r1 > 0, r3 = r1 ⇤ 4, r4 = r2 ⇤ 4}
3 = {r3   320, r4  1024}
4 = {n = 4} [ 1 [ 2 [ 3
We obtain that r1 ⇤ 4   320 ) r1   80 and r2 ⇤ 4  1024 ) r2  256. Minimizing for r1 and
maximizing for r2 gives the resolution range [80,256] required of the sensor to be allocated for this
fragment.
Worst-Case Computational Cost and Expression Size Bounds
The worst case computational cost is given as a result of our type system as the first argument after the
$ in a typing judgment. This is a scalar value and could be adjusted/calibrated as a function to estimate
actual execution times on various physical resources. The worst-case computational bounds provided
by our system provide one static-time validation mechanism to determine if explicit deadlines (or other
run-time constraints given other Flowtypes) can not be met as specified. As presented, the deadline
opcode relies on the unadjusted (discretized) computation bound.
In addition to static verification, the Service Dispatcher component of snBench often must partition
a task across physical resources if there is insu cient computing resources available on a single node
to accommodate the entire task. The worst case computational cost, as presented, provides us with an
initial metric to guide the allocation of physical computing nodes and sensory resources for a given task
(and its constituent subtasks).
Similarly, for any given task or sub-task we can look at the upper bound size annotation on its type
information to determine the potential network overhead associated with partitioning the larger task at
that point.
4.6 Implementation Details
The type system described in this document has been implemented as part of our snBench project.
The implementation has been done in Java, making use of the open-source JavaCC project [Sri]. In its
current incarnation it is presented as part of the snBench development tool chain; the type checker
is automatically invoked when compiling our high-level language (SNAFU) programming language to
STEP. As the implementation is entirely modular and checks STEP code rather than SNAFU code,
nothing stops us from using the type checker apart from the SNAFU compiler, however (1) SNAFU is
eminently more readable than STEP and (2) the implementation includes several hooks to track line
numbers within SNAFU code as an error tracking convenience to its users. Put di↵erently, while the
type system can exist without SNAFU, we have gone to some lengths to ensure SNAFU users can enjoy
the benefit of this type checker as well.
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Our implementation of the type checking engine includes a broader range of STEP constructs than
the Core STEP that is presented here, however there are some limitations to this support; for constructs
for which we lack the complete formalism use heuristics to bound cost and default back to basic, unsized
type checking rather that annotated type checking for opcodes which lack size constraint annotation.
To solve the constraint sets that are built as a result of the sized type checking, we invoke the GNU
Linear Programming Toolkit (GLPK) [And], which can be used to solve a system of constraints for
linear programming, and mixed integer programming. The decision to use GLPK is based on project
maturity, community support and API availability. At present we emit our sizing constraints in the
GNU MathProg language and invoke the GLPK via external script, though nothing (other than time)
precludes finer integration via the GLPK Java Interface [Bjo].
Figures 2 and 3 are screen shots taken from the the SNAFU development environment that feature
results generated from the implementation of the type checker.
Figure 2: A screen shot from the SNAFU compiler showing the successful type checking of a STEP program. By
default, the feedback is given graphically to the user.
5 Future Work
5.1 Additional Type Annotations
In this paper we have presented upper and lower size bound data type annotation, yet other useful
annotations exist and can be easily integrated into this type system by extending the existing annotation
pair to a tuple or larger ordered set and defining the desired subtyping relation.
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Figure 3: A screen shot from the SNAFU compiler showing size annotation constraints that result from type checking
a STEP program.
One such example is the notion of image quality, which is di↵erent from data size. Data size is used
bound the operational requirements of a function (including those that manipulate images), whereas
image quality speaks to the valid data in the image. As far as operational/functional correctness is
concerned a resized image is operationally valid, however with respect to the desired programmatic
output, a smaller image that has been resized to a larger resolution is not truly interchangeable with
an image captured at a larger resolution. When an image is resized (e.g., via scaling or resampling,
say) the size (resolution) of the image changes no longer reflects the number of data points it contained
originally (we are calling this “quality”).
We could easily support a notion of an image’s quality within our type annotations, by adding a
dimension for the “lowest” value that we have ever seen for an image’s lower size bound.6 This value
could distinguish between a true high resolution image and data that has been up-cast or coerced to
satisfy a function’s size constraints. Quality also has a well established meaning with respect to numerical
data as well, and might be defined to reflect potential for rounding errors, data accuracy, etc. Certainly
other image and video related aspects could be tracked as well, including color-depth for images, frame
rates for video, and so on.
6Recall the definition of T-Resample increases both the upper and the lower size bound.
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5.2 Applications to Image Pyramids
Image Pyramids [Kro91],[AH91] are a well established technique in the field of image processing. The
technique involves maintaining multiple copies of the same image at di↵erent resolutions (the a hierarchy
of resolutions form a logical pyramid) such that the appropriate resolution can be selected for manipu-
lation depending on the needs of the manipulation function. The applications of this formalism to this
community is potentially two-fold. (1) We can extend the type system to include an image pyramid as
a first class type and extend the annotations to support the list of resolutions available in the pyramid.
(2) Static analysis of the image processing flow can tell us precisely which resolutions need to be kept
in the pyramid and which can be removed. In the latter case, the potential benefit of snBench and
sized typing is quite significant as it might be possible to remove the pyramid entirely. For distributed
computations, we can split the pyramid into individual image instances based on the analysis of size/use
and ensure that we are passing as few copies of the image (inside the pyramid) and as few copies of the
pyramid itself, as possible.
5.3 Cost and Size Signatures For New Opcodes
The operational correctness of the type system is contingent on the presence of accurate size, cost and
constraint data for Opcodes (primitive operators). snBench provides a facility by which new Opcodes
may be added to a service library quickly and easily, through the implementation of a simple Java
interface. At present the type system maintains an embedded definition for the latent costs and size
constraints of the current Opcode library, however for the sustainability of the type system, it is essential
that these definitions are provided by the Opcode authors and automatically extracted directly from
the Opcode definitions. Beside changing the Opcode implementation interface, the type system must
also change to import the rules from the Opcode library directly. There is also a concern that Opcode
authors might specify very weak size constraints and very high costs (possibly lacking the knowledge to
do so correctly) and that the end result is a type system that is only as strong as its weakest link. Any
future work that would automatically extract this information from an Opcode implementation would
be a fantastic solution to this problem (and others).
5.4 Di↵erent Models of Cost
At present our type system provides a single model of computational cost, a worst-case upper bound.
As there is the possibility for multiple size annotations (dimensions) of types, there is an opportunity
to provide multiple cost metrics based on these other dimensions. Defining a so-called “minimum”
computational cost (or optimal case) would be trivial, and other cost models including non-computation
costs models (e.g., defining some financial cost, or total memory utilization cost) would be possible, if
not trivial. The approach that seems the most straight forward to enabling multiple cost models would
be to provide functional costs, such that all costs computed on the right hand side of the $ would be
user/programmer customizable and configurable as a function of the data available in the typing rules.
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5.5 Expanding to “Complete” STEP
At present we support only a subset of the STEP programming language. The remaining STEP con-
structs (e.g., streaming/persistent triggers and their associated read semantics) are di cult to represent
as a result of their asynchronous execution and complex internal state. Despite these challenges, we have
worked to establish a typing formalisms for these constructs however they are presently incomplete. De-
spite this, the present limited form is useful for non-persistent, “straight-shot” programs (which actually
capture a significant amount of image processing tasks). For persistent/streaming trigger constructs
we apply a simple heuristic: we solve the computable portion and multiply by estimates to derive the
approximate costs for services that include non-Core portions of STEP. Regardless of this makeshift
solution, it would be advantageous (and naturally appealing) to have a type system that includes the
complete STEP language.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented our formal type system for multi-dimensional sized types. Unlike other
sized type systems our work tracks both an upper and lower size bound for data, defines a logical subtype
relation for images capable of bounding computation, maintaining functional correctness, and deduce
feasible data sizes from implicit and explicit constraints within program fragments. We presented this
system and have provided examples that illustrate the use of the type system. We are confident in the
many potential uses for this formalism to the Image processing and Sense and Respond communities.
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